The NATO Summit, held in The Hague from 24-25 June 2025, has concluded not with a bang, but with a terse, five-paragraph communiqué that papers over the deepest fractures in the alliance’s recent history. Leaders gathered at the World Forum to reaffirm their bond, but the proceedings were dominated by the transactional demands of United States President Donald Trump. The result is a landmark new commitment to raise defence spending to 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2035, a move that analysts argue cements NATO’s shift from a “community of values” to a purely instrumental arrangement. This transformation, coupled with persistent uncertainty over American commitments, has simultaneously accelerated the “Europeanisation” of support for Ukraine and spurred the European Union’s desperate scramble for strategic autonomy. In my view, the alliance’s survival as a coherent security community, rather than a fragile transaction, is now in serious doubt.
The Hague Reckoning: A 5% Target for a Transactional Alliance
The central outcome of The Hague summit is the new defence investment pledge. This new target is a direct result of intense pressure from the Trump administration, which has long framed the alliance not through the lens of shared security, but as a protection arrangement where allies must “pay your bills”. President Trump immediately claimed the agreement as a “great victory,” telling a press conference he hoped the additional funds would be spent on military hardware made in the U.S.. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, when questioned about his placatory tone, insisted Trump deserved “all the praise” for securing the deal.
This new 5% commitment fundamentally redefines allied burden-sharing. The official declaration breaks the figure into two categories:
- 3.5% of GDP annually allocated to “core defence requirements”.
- 1.5% of GDP annually for related spending on critical infrastructure, cyber-defence, industrial innovation, and resilience.
Significantly, the text allows allies to include direct contributions towards Ukraine’s defence and its industry when calculating these figures. This pivot to a hard financial metric confirms a profound “identity crisis”. Analysts note this marks the culmination of a shift away from the constructivist view of NATO as a “security community” built on trust and shared liberal-democratic values. Instead, the alliance is now operating under a transactional and realist logic, driven by the immediate national interests of its most powerful member.

Cracks in the Façade: Spain’s Defiance and ‘Fuzzy’ Commitments
Despite the summit’s official message of “unity and strength”, the façade is visibly cracked. The new 5% target is seen as a “tall order” for many European nations already struggling with high public debt, such as the UK and France. Analysts warn that meeting these goals could require “unpalatable sacrifices,” including hefty tax hikes or spending cuts that could, in turn, fuel populist and nationalist sentiment across the continent.
The most public crack came from Spain. Spanish President Pedro Sánchez, while affirming his country would reach the previous 2% GDP target in 2025, pointedly refused to endorse the new 5% goal. In a statement, Sánchez declared the 2% figure to be a “sufficient, realistic volume of investment, and importantly, is compatible with our welfare state”. He suggested allies should “less talk of percentages of GDP and more talk of co-production, joint purchasing and interoperability”.
President Trump reacted swiftly, publicly condemning the Spanish stance and threatening punitive measures. “We’re going to make them pay,” Trump said, indicating that Spain would face repercussions in future trade deals. This rift highlights the “fuzzy” and ambiguous language of The Hague communiqué. Analysts note a critical distinction between the English version, which states “Allies commit” (without a determiner), and the equally valid French version, which uses “les Alliés” (the Allies) . This ambiguity, which the Spanish government is reportedly leveraging, allows for the interpretation that the 5% target is not a binding commitment for all members, but rather an aim for those who “decide to or need to do so”.

The ‘Europeanisation’ of Ukraine Amid US Disengagement
Conspicuously, the brief Hague communiqué largely avoided the most pressing security challenge: the war in Ukraine. This omission reflects a strategic “Europeanisation” of support for Kyiv, a trend forced by the Trump administration’s disengagement. The alliance’s credibility was severely damaged following a tense Oval Office meeting in February 2025, where President Trump reportedly chided Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy for his gratitude and attire. Following that meeting, US military support to Ukraine was temporarily suspended, and Trump demanded economic compensation for past aid .
This American vacuum has forced the European Union to emerge as a key security actor. The EU and its Member States have mobilised €50.8 billion in total military aid to Ukraine. This support is channelled through instruments like the European Peace Facility (EPF), which has allocated €6.1 billion for weapons , and the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM), which has trained over 75,000 Ukrainian troops. While Zelenskiy did meet Trump on the sidelines of the Hague summit—notably wearing a more formal black suit-style jacket in an act of “visual diplomacy” rather than his usual khaki—the substantive support for Ukraine’s war effort is now a primarily European-led affair.
Building ‘Fortress Europe’: The EU’s Scramble for Defence Readiness
The uncertainty over the US security guarantee has triggered more than just support for Ukraine; it has ignited the EU’s long-dormant quest for “strategic autonomy”. Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 served as the first stark warning, but President Trump’s rhetoric—and that of his administration—has created an existential crisis. A speech by US Vice President James D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, which declared that Europe’s own democratic erosion was a greater threat than Russia, was perceived in European capitals as a “declaration of ideological war” and a serious challenge to collective defence .
In response, the EU is rapidly attempting to build its own defence industrial base, moving from rhetoric to action. Key initiatives include:
- EDIRPA (European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act) to promote collaborative procurement.
- ASAP (Act in Support of Ammunition Production) to ramp up ammunition and missile production.
- A new European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), unveiled in March 2024, to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).
Furthermore, the European Commission has unveiled the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, a five-point strategy to boost capabilities. This plan is underpinned by the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, which offers up to €150 billion in EU-backed loans for national defence investments. This is all guided by the new White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, which focuses on closing capability gaps in areas like air defence, artillery, and drones .

Conclusion: An Alliance in Hibernation?
The Hague Summit of 2025 successfully kept the United States inside the NATO tent, but at the cost of the alliance’s soul. The new 5% spending target provides a clear, if brutally transactional, metric for allied commitment, but it fails to resolve the deep political and strategic rifts that plague the organisation. Persistent structural frictions, such as the unresolved Cyprus-Türkiye dispute that continues to block formal EU-NATO intelligence sharing, remain unaddressed.
Analysts suggest the alliance may be entering a state of “hibernation”—alive in theory but lacking effective deterrence or cohesion. The common narrative has been reduced to “institutional minimums” to avoid provoking a US exit, leaving the EU to pursue its own security autonomy as a hedge. The Hague communiqué saved NATO from immediate collapse, but at what cost? With trust—the essential currency of a security community—fully spent, the big picture reveals a critical question: Can an alliance survive on financial transactions alone, or has the erosion of shared values already sealed its fate?
FAQ
The main outcome was a new commitment for allies to invest 5% of their GDP in defence by 2035. This was a “great victory” for US President Donald Trump, who had demanded the increase.
It comprises 3.5% of GDP for “core defence requirements” and 1.5% of GDP for related security spending, such as critical infrastructure, cyber-defence, and strengthening the defence industry.
Ostensibly yes, but there are deep divisions. Spain’s President, Pedro Sánchez, publicly stated that its 2% GDP contribution is “sufficient” and “realistic,” rejecting the 5% goal. This prompted a public rebuke from President Trump.
Analysts argue the alliance is shifting from a “security community” based on shared democratic values to a “transactional” arrangement. The focus, driven by the US, is now on financial contributions rather than shared strategic goals.
The EU is accelerating its push for “strategic autonomy”. It has launched several new defence industrial policies, including EDIRPA (common procurement), ASAP (ammunition production), and the ReArm Europe plan, backed by a €150 billion loan instrument called SAFE.
he English text states “Allies commit” to the 5% target, while the equally valid French text says “les Alliés” (The Allies). This ambiguity allows countries like Spain to interpret the goal as non-binding for every single member.